Collusive bargaining behavior in supply chains

Key findings from this study

• The study found that exploitative supplier leadership and distributor network embeddedness are the primary drivers of collusive bargaining behavior.
• The authors report that collusive bargaining directly increases distributor opportunism, but market uncertainty moderates this relationship.
• The researchers demonstrate that asymmetric asset specificity favoring the distributor inhibits collusive behavior formation.

Overview

This study examines collusive bargaining behavior among distributors in supply chains with a single supplier. The research identifies antecedents and consequences of distributor collusion. Survey data from 327 Chinese distributors reveals how exploitative supplier leadership and network embeddedness drive collusive engagement, while asymmetric asset specificity inhibits it.

Methods and approach

The researchers collected survey data from 327 distributors in Chinese supply chains. Hierarchical regression analyses tested relationships between supplier leadership practices, distributor network embeddedness, asset specificity, and collusive bargaining outcomes. Market uncertainty was examined as a contingency variable moderating the relationship between collusion and opportunism.

Results

Exploitative supplier leadership and distributor network embeddedness emerge as primary determinants of collusive bargaining engagement. Asymmetric asset specificity favoring the distributor reduces collusive behavior. Collusive bargaining correlates positively with distributor opportunism. Market uncertainty weakens the positive association between collusion and opportunistic conduct. The contingency effects indicate that environmental conditions shape collusion-opportunism dynamics.

Implications

The findings suggest that supplier governance structures meaningfully influence distributor coalition formation. Organizations implementing exploitative leadership practices risk triggering collective resistance through collusive bargaining. Managers should recognize that network embeddedness facilitates coordination among trading partners, enabling bargaining coalitions that may undermine supplier control.

Market uncertainty functions as a natural dampener on opportunistic outcomes from collusive behavior. This suggests that in volatile environments, the payoff structure for opportunistic actions diminishes, reducing incentives for exploiting collusive advantages. Supply chain governance strategies must account for how environmental conditions mediate the relationship between bargaining behavior and subsequent misconduct.

The protective role of asymmetric asset specificity indicates that distributor-specific investments create dependency dynamics favoring individual negotiation. Suppliers seeking to prevent collusion could strategically structure contractual relationships to increase distributor asset commitment. Such arrangements realign incentives toward independent rather than collective bargaining positions.

Scope and limitations

This summary is based on the study abstract and available metadata. It does not include a full analysis of the complete paper, supplementary materials, or underlying datasets unless explicitly stated. Findings should be interpreted in the context of the original publication.