Use of system dynamics model for stability analysis of contractor and government environmental strategies for transportation infrastructure

Key findings from this study

This research indicates that:

• Pure strategy equilibria cannot achieve evolutionary stability in contractor-regulator interactions regardless of regulatory parameters
• Mixed strategy equilibria demonstrate conditional stability specifically when public reporting systems remain operational
• Public disclosure mechanisms generate sustainable long-term compliance patterns whereas financial penalties produce only transient behavior modification

Overview

This research integrates evolutionary game theory with system dynamics modeling to analyze how government regulatory mechanisms shape contractor compliance with environmental standards in transportation infrastructure development. The framework simulates interactions between contractors and regulatory agencies to identify policy designs that sustain both ecological and economic objectives.

Methods and approach

An integrated computational framework combines evolutionary game theory with system dynamics simulation. Researchers modeled contractor-regulator interactions and conducted computational experiments examining the effects of two policy mechanisms: financial penalties and public reporting systems. The analysis assessed behavioral stability across varying parameter configurations.

Results

Pure strategy equilibria fail to achieve evolutionary stability across all tested configurations. Mixed strategy equilibria exhibit conditional stability when public reporting systems operate, indicating that contractor and regulator behavior simultaneously influences compliance outcomes. Financial penalties produce short-term behavior modification but do not sustain compliance over extended periods. In contrast, public monitoring and disclosure systems generate stable compliance patterns that persist across time horizons. The stability of mixed strategies depends critically on the transparency and operation of public reporting mechanisms.

Implications

Regulatory design substantially influences the sustainability of environmental compliance in infrastructure development. Policymakers should prioritize transparent monitoring systems over exclusive reliance on punitive mechanisms. Public reporting creates durable incentive alignment between contractors and ecological objectives through continuous visibility rather than through fear of financial consequences. Combining penalty frameworks with robust oversight offers a structural approach to advancing environmental performance in construction sectors. The findings suggest that transparency mechanisms constitute a foundational component of effective environmental governance.

Scope and limitations

This summary is based on the study abstract and available metadata. It does not include a full analysis of the complete paper, supplementary materials, or underlying datasets unless explicitly stated. Findings should be interpreted in the context of the original publication.