Mistranslation of Uncertainties: From Epistemological Uncertainties to Legitimate Resilience Governance

Overview

This research examines failures in resilience governance that occur when governmental institutions mistranslate epistemological uncertainties—fundamental uncertainties about knowledge itself—into purely technical and managerial problems. The study employs two comparative case studies of sociotechnical disasters: nuclear safety failures and pandemic digital surveillance systems. Grounded in post-normal science frameworks, the analysis identifies how this mistranslation process marginalizes epistemic diversity, creates legitimacy deficits in policy implementation, and ultimately erodes sociotechnical resilience. The research proposes that integrating democratic deliberation and epistemic co-production into institutional governance structures can realign resilience work with social legitimacy requirements.

Methods and approach

The study employs comparative case study methodology examining nuclear safety failures and pandemic digital surveillance as instances of sociotechnical disaster. The analytical framework draws on Funtowicz and Ravetz's post-normal science theory, which characterizes conditions where uncertainty is high, stakes are significant, and decisions must be made despite incomplete knowledge. The research conceptualizes three distinct types of uncertainties and traces how governmental institutions systematically mistranslate epistemological uncertainties into technical problems amenable to conventional managerial solutions. The analysis identifies structural mechanisms through which this mistranslation occurs and visualizes the consequent legitimacy deficits that emerge from implementation gaps.

Key Findings

The analysis reveals that mistranslation of uncertainties operates through a monolithic, technocentric institutional framing that privileges instrumental rationality while marginalizing alternative ways of knowing and sources of epistemic authority. This process generates policy-implementation legitimacy deficits because technical solutions fail to address the underlying epistemological contestation. The comparative cases demonstrate that nuclear and pandemic surveillance governance both exhibit patterns wherein diverse epistemic communities—scientists with conflicting models, affected publics, regulatory bodies—are excluded from or marginalized within decision-making processes. These exclusions occur when uncertainties are redefined as purely technical problems solvable through expert consensus rather than acknowledged as fundamentally contested domains requiring negotiated resolution.

Implications

The findings indicate that conventional resilience governance frameworks that focus solely on system technical robustness and adaptive capacity are insufficient when legitimacy deficits undermine institutional credibility and public compliance. Sociotechnical systems vulnerable to catastrophic failure require governance approaches that explicitly address the epistemological dimensions of uncertainty rather than suppressing them through technical rhetoric. The research demonstrates that resilience cannot be achieved through technocratic approaches alone when public trust and democratic legitimacy have been eroded through the exclusion of diverse epistemic perspectives from governance processes. Institutional practices must create space for deliberative processes that acknowledge uncertainty's irreducibility and the validity of multiple knowledge frameworks.

Scope and limitations

This summary is based on the study abstract and available metadata. It does not include a full analysis of the complete paper, supplementary materials, or underlying datasets unless explicitly stated. Findings should be interpreted in the context of the original publication.