What the study found
The authors argue that a person is in a position to know that p if and only if they can know that p. They say this means position-to-know statements are a special case of ability statements, linked by compossibility.
What the authors say this matters
The authors conclude that their compossibility theory of epistemic modality is novel because it subsumes epistemic modality under agentive modality, the modality that characterizes what agents can do.
What the researchers tested
This is a philosophical article that presents an argument about the meaning of "in a position to know" and "can know." The abstract does not describe experiments or empirical methods.
What worked and what didn't
The abstract states the central claim that the two kinds of statements are equivalent under the authors' account. It does not report separate outcomes, comparisons, or empirical tests.
What to keep in mind
The available summary does not describe limitations, objections, or boundary conditions beyond the stated equivalence claim.
Key points
- The authors argue that being in a position to know that p is equivalent to being able to know that p.
- They treat position-to-know ascriptions as a special case of ability ascriptions.
- Their account uses compossibility, which they describe as what makes ability statements true.
- They say the theory is novel because it subsumes epistemic modality under agentive modality.
- The abstract presents a philosophical argument and does not describe empirical methods.
Disclosure
- Research title:
- Ability and epistemic position are treated as the same kind of modality
- Authors:
- Timothy Kearl, Christopher Willard‐Kyle
- Institutions:
- Flagler College, University of Kentucky
- Publication date:
- 2026-01-29
- OpenAlex record:
- View
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