What the study found
The commentary argues that there are more fundamental reasons to reject Derek Parfit’s endorsement of temporal neutrality than reasons based on our relationships. It also focuses on Samuel Scheffler’s conditional acceptance of a revised version of Parfit’s “excellent argument.”
Why the authors say this matters
The authors suggest this matters because it bears on whether Parfit’s view of temporal neutrality should be accepted. In the abstract, the relevance is framed as a challenge to Parfit’s position rather than as a broader claim beyond that debate.
What the researchers tested
This is a commentary on Samuel Scheffler’s book One Life to Lead, with attention to chapter 2. The author examines Scheffler’s conditional acceptance of a revised form of Parfit’s “excellent argument” and compares it with reasons for rejecting temporal neutrality.
What worked and what didn't
The commentary suggests that Scheffler’s revised acceptance of Parfit’s argument is not enough to settle the issue. It argues that reasons for rejecting temporal neutrality go beyond those arising from our relationships.
What to keep in mind
The available summary is brief and does not provide detailed arguments, evidence, or examples. Limitations are not described in the abstract.
Key points
- The piece is a commentary on Samuel Scheffler’s One Life to Lead.
- It focuses on chapter 2 of Scheffler’s book.
- The author discusses a revised version of Parfit’s “excellent argument.”
- The commentary argues there are deeper reasons to reject Parfit’s temporal neutrality.
- The abstract does not describe detailed methods or empirical evidence.
Disclosure
- Research title:
- The commentary questions Parfit’s temporal neutrality
- Authors:
- M. Ángeles Martín
- Institutions:
- University of California, Berkeley, University of Oxford
- Publication date:
- 2026-02-21
- OpenAlex record:
- View
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