What the study found
The study presents aLEAKator, an open-source framework for automated formal verification of masked cryptographic accelerators and software on CPUs from HDL descriptions. It uses mixed-domain simulation to model leakage under several 1-probing leakage models, including robust and relaxed versions.
Why the authors say this matters
The authors say this matters because verifying masked hardware and software under advanced leakage models is difficult, especially when glitches, transitions, and CPU micro-architectural details must be considered. They conclude that aLEAKator addresses limits in existing verification approaches, including restrictions to small hardware gadgets, small CPU programs, limited leakage models, or the need for hardware-specific prior knowledge.
What the researchers tested
The researchers developed an open-source framework and evaluated it against existing tools and real-world measurements. They tested verification of masked cryptographic accelerators and software running on CPUs from HDL descriptions, including cases with lookup tables and without requiring prior knowledge of the target CPU architecture.
What worked and what didn't
The abstract reports that aLEAKator supports variable signal granularity rather than being limited to 1-bit wires. It also supports verification with lookup tables and can handle robust and relaxed 1-probing leakage models. The authors state that their approach produced innovative results, including verification of a full, first-order masked AES on various CPUs.
What to keep in mind
The abstract does not describe detailed limitations, failure cases, or performance tradeoffs. The claims here are limited to what is stated in the abstract, including the validation against existing tools and real-world measurements.
Key points
- aLEAKator is an open-source framework for automated formal verification from HDL descriptions.
- It models masked hardware and software under mixed-domain simulation and 1-probing leakage models.
- The framework supports variable signal granularity and lookup tables.
- The authors say it does not require prior knowledge of the target CPU architecture.
- The abstract reports verification of a full, first-order masked AES on various CPUs.
Disclosure
- Research title:
- aLEAKator verifies masked hardware and software under leakage models
- Authors:
- Noé Amiot, Quentin Meunier, Karine Heydemann, Emmanuelle Encrenaz
- Institutions:
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Sorbonne Université, Laboratoire Jacques-Louis Lions, Thales (France)
- Publication date:
- 2026-04-23
- OpenAlex record:
- View
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