Victory or frozen conflict? Assessing the feasibility of Ukraine’s victory-oriented strategy to conflict termination

Overview

This study assesses whether Ukraine could have avoided a frozen conflict with Russia by pursuing a victory-oriented strategy supported by increased Western aid. Using empirical patterns from a dataset of historical frozen conflicts, the paper derives five necessary criteria for achieving a military termination rather than a frozen outcome. Two counterfactual scenarios—accelerated and expanded Western assistance—are evaluated against these criteria. The principal conclusion is that even substantial additional Western aid would probably not have produced the decisive military outcome required to compel Russia to accept defeat and resolve core political issues, rendering the victory-oriented strategy implausible as a pathway out of frozen conflict.

Methods and approach

The analysis operationalizes a comparative framework based on the Klosek et al. (2021) frozen-conflict dataset to identify characteristics associated with military terminations. Five criteria necessary for a military end are specified (political willingness to concede core issues, decisive battlefield superiority, sustainable occupation or coercive capacity, domestic and allied cohesion, and deterrence against third-party escalation). Two counterfactual scenarios model variations in the timing, scale, and composition of Western military and logistical assistance and assess whether these changes would enable Ukraine to meet the specified criteria. Inference relies on counterfactual plausibility checks against historical analogues and constraint-based assessment of adversary incentives.

Results

Neither accelerated nor substantially larger Western assistance reliably satisfies the five necessary criteria for military termination. Additional materiel and tempo improvements could have improved battlefield performance but would not have altered Russia's political unwillingness to accept core concessions or its capacity to impose enduring costs. Structural asymmetries—strategic depth, mobilization potential, and nuclear-backed deterrence—limit the feasibility of sustained coercive occupation or unconditional defeat. Allied cohesion and domestic Ukrainian resolve, while important, cannot substitute for the requirement that the adversary face credible political incentives to accept termination on Ukrainian terms. Consequently, a battlefield-centric path to termination remained unlikely.

Implications

Policy implications prioritize diplomatic and negotiated modalities for conflict termination over reliance on a sole strategy of decisive military victory; resources should be allocated to conflict-management mechanisms that address the political roots of dispute and create credible settlement incentives. Operational planning should incorporate realistic assessments of opponent incentives and structural constraints rather than assuming force alone can secure comprehensive resolution. Scholarly implications include the need to investigate political and cognitive drivers behind the preference for victory-oriented strategies, the role of alliance politics in shaping ambitious military objectives, and the empirical boundary conditions under which military coercion has historically induced adversary concession.